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Meinong on Aesthetic Objects 






In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means 
of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion 
undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing 
especially on Über emotionale Präsentation, I examine, on the one 
hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects 
apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are 
ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the 
capacity to attract aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are 
connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results 
are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain 
of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute 
beauty is discussed. 
1. Introduction: The way ahead 
While Meinong’s theses about fictional objects have been widely examined and 
are still discussed, his theory of aesthetic objects has not yet received the 
attention it deserves. Actually, even if the problem of fictional objects is of 
considerable importance for Aesthetics, a fictional object is not necessarily an 
aesthetic object. The goat-stag (τραγέλαφος) of which Aristotle speaks1 is an 
object of fiction, not an aesthetic object. Thus, neither non-existence nor 
being the product of phantasy constitute sufficient conditions for something to 
be an aesthetic object. Therefore the question arises, what are the necessary 
 
† Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo, Italy. 
1 Cf. Aristotle, De interpr. 1, 16a16–18; Phys. IV 1, 208a29–31; An. pr. I 38, 49a24; An. post. I 7, 
92b7. 
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conditions for the constitution of aesthetic objects?  
A composite answer to this question is offered by Meinong, together with 
several members of the Graz School, as the controversies between its members 
show. Not only Stephan Witasek in his Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik 
[Outlines of General Aesthetics] (1904), but also Christian von Ehrenfels, 
France Veber, Rudolf Ameseder, Alois Höfler, Robert Saxinger and Ernst 
Schwarz dealt with topics in Aesthetics. In the present paper, I will not 
undertake to deal with the aesthetic theory developed by Meinong or by the 
Graz school comprehensively,2 but rather restrict myself to the issue of 
aesthetic objects. 
Meinong did not write a specific text on Aesthetics, but he did touch on 
questions of Aesthetics in several works, and these allow us to assume that 
Meinong had developed an elaborate set of ideas on the subject. His most 
structured conceptions about Aesthetics can be found in one of his latest and 
most difficult works, namely Über emotionale Präsentation [On Emotional 
Presentation] (1917), which presupposes – and sometimes revises – the 
results of his researches in the theory of objects, the theory of values, and 
psychology. In what follows I’ll try to trace a theoretical path through 
Meinong’s writings, with particular attention given to this work (Meinong, 
1917), in order to highlight the notion of aesthetic object and illustrate the 
changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output. 
According to Meinong, any object (concrete, abstract, non-existent and 
even impossible) is given independently of the subject, but is accessible only by 
means of the subject – to put it more precisely – by means of mental 
experiences (representations, thoughts, feelings, desires). In particular, 
aesthetic objects can be attained by means of a peculiar kind of experience 
(Erlebnis), namely, aesthetic feelings. It is thus necessary also to deal with the 
emotions and their objects, that is to say, with values. For Meinong, aesthetic 
objects can be understood by analogy with objects of value, while remaining 
distinct from them.3 
2. Values and Emotions (Meinong’s First Value Theory) 
In his first theory of values, presented in Psychologisch-ethische Unter-
 
2 About this, see Raspa (2010). 
3 Reicher (2006) acknowledges that Meinong’s value theory can be applied to Aesthetics, but she does 
not investigate what Meinong actually said about aesthetic values.  
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suchungen zur Wert-Theorie [Psychological-Ethical Investigations on Value 
Theory] (1894), Meinong conceives value as depending on the psychical or 
mental, that is, on psychological analysis. In the first instance, we can say that 
something has a value for us when it is not a matter of indifference to us. 
Analogously, in so far as an aesthetic object has a value, we are not indifferent 
to it – it arouses something in us. Here Meinong defines value by means of the 
notion of possibility: the value an object has resides in the possibility of its 
being evaluated (Werthgehalten-werden-können). Thus an object has a value 
in so far as it is able to arouse in a subject the basis of a value-feeling (Cf. 
Meinong, 1894, GA III, p. 37) (i.e. a feeling of pleasure or displeasure for the 
existence or the non-existence of something). One year later, in Über 
Werthaltung und Wert [On Valuation and Value], Meinong states again that 
«The value of an object can be […] defined as its capacity to be appreciated by 
an intellectually and emotionally normal subject» (Meinong, 1895, GA III, p. 
248). Valuation (Werthhaltung) is that psychical fact (a feeling) that is always 
associated with a value. If something has a value for me, then I will be related to 
it in such a peculiar way that the thing will acquire a special meaning for me 
(Cf. Meinong, 1894, GA III, p. 26). Valuation makes an object’s value 
manifest; notwithstanding, value is not connected with actual valuation – this in 
fact not only can vary from person to person but in certain circumstances can 
even not arise – rather with potential valuation. According to Psychologisch-
ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-Theorie, value belongs to the object, but it 
requires an existing subject to make the valuation. As a consequence, a thing 
loses its value as soon as the subject (for which it has a value) ceases to exist. 
To ascribe a value to something thus means not only to ascribe to it a certain 
faculty, but at the same time to assert the existence of a subject which can 
realize this faculty (Meinong 1894, GA III, p. 40). 
Furthermore, the object has certain properties that, once they are 
acknowledged by the subject, allow for its valuation; and the object possesses 
these properties independently of being valuated. This means that value and 
valuation must be kept distinguished and that value is a second-order property, 
or, as Meinong will say in Über emotionale Präsentation, a higher-order 
property (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 392, 394 [1972, pp. 96, 97–98]).4 
If we apply this definition of value to a property like beauty, it follows that an 
 
4 See also Meinong (1921, GA VII, p. 22; 1974, pp. 228–229). 
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object is beautiful if it is able to arouse in a subject the grounds for a positive 
aesthetic feeling. I stress here “positive” because even ugly, gloomy, 
languishing or boring are aesthetic properties. 
There is another topic that anticipates Meinong’s mature theory: the 
cognitive role of emotions. Emotions perform an intellectual function by 
means of which properties such as the beautiful, good or pleasant – which 
require a valuation – can be apprehended. Otherwise, i.e. without taking 
emotions into account, the apprehension of such properties would be 
forbidden. In any case, it would appear that common sense does not 
distinguish physical from aesthetic properties, e.g. a harmonious from a low 
voice (Cf. Meinong, 1894, GA III, p. 38).5 While the pitch is a property of the 
object (the voice), which is perceived by means of a sense organ, its being 
harmonious is grasped also by means of a feeling, which – according to 
Meinong – is not a property of the object, but indicates a relation between the 
subject and the object or, more accurately, some of the object’s properties. 
This seems to hold both for aesthetic feelings and value-feelings, which in any 
case differ in this regard: value-feelings are directed toward existence, while 
aesthetic feelings seem to be indifferent as regards existence, being thus 
directed – to adopt a term from Meinong’s mature vocabulary – toward so-
being (Cf. Meinong, 1894, GA III, p. 28).6 
Another point, which will be developed in a very different way in Über 
emotionale Präsentation, concerns the relativity of value and hence of aesthetic 
properties like beauty. Since – as we have already highlighted – a value is given 
only because and only in so far as a subject exists for which it is a value, it 
follows that there is no absolute value, but only one that is relative to a subject. 
Whatever, according to Meinong, this does not mean that there are no 
objective values. 
In the preceding, we have said that value and valuation must be kept 
distinguished. In fact, valuation is a psychical fact, while value is an object’s 
quality that does not spring forth from the valuation. Value does not 
correspond to value-feeling, but it is associated with a feeling, at least possibly, 
since a thing has a value not only when a subject pays attention to it, but even 
when it is not thought of and hence it is not valuated. It often happens that we 
attribute value to something which has no value or, conversely, we refrain from 
 
5 Cf. also (Schuhmann, 2001, p. 533). 
6 In § 5 (see fn. 12) we will see that Meinong will replace “existence” with “being”. 
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attributing value to something which has it. A subject can attribute value to an 
event which has not taken place; or she can attribute to a twig the value of a 
divining rod. In these two cases, by means of valuation, a value is ascribed to 
the object which depends only on the subject, being thus totally subjective. 
When valuation is really applied to an object (as for example to a medicinal 
plant), then its value is objective (Cf. Meinong, 1894, GA III, pp. 78–81). 
Value therefore is objective when its valuation does not rest on false premises 
(judgments) as in the case of superstition. In § 7, we will see that the meaning 
of “objective” shows a strong analogy with the meaning of “justified” 
(berechtigt). Following this analogy, we can also say that there is an objective 
beauty, which does not depend only on subjective liking. Now this is only a 
surmise made by analogy but we will deal with it at the end of this paper. 
3. Impersonal Values and Emotional Presentation 
(Meinong’s Later Value Theory) 
Even if Meinong in his Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-
Theorie speaks of objective values, he still subscribes here to a subjectivistic 
theory of values. Seventeen years later, in his Für die Psychologie und gegen 
den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie [For Psychology and 
against Psychologism in the General Value Theory] (1912), his value theory 
undergoes an objectivistic twist, as a consequence of his theory of objects.7 
There, Meinong asserts that «the value of an object lies in the fact that a subject 
has, could have or should reasonably have an interest in the object» (Meinong, 
1912, GA III, p. 277). With the expression “should reasonably have”, 
Meinong asserts that not all values are relative; he does not give up on the idea 
that certain values arise and vanish with a subject, but he asserts that, next to 
these kinds of values – called “personal” – there are also “impersonal” (or 
absolute) values, which brought him – as he himself admits (Cf. Meinong, 
1917, GA III, p. 438 [1972, p. 135]) – to abandon the relativistic and 
psychologistic position he previously upheld. It is within this new conception 
that Meinong develops his theses about aesthetic objects, which we have up to 
this point treated by analogy with objects of value. But it is worth noting that 
the framework is not completely different, so that the new conceptions enrich 
and complete the earlier ones. 
 
7 About this, as well as about pre- and post- theory of objects’ value theories, see (Raspa, 2013). 
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In the first instance, Meinong maintains again that our attitude toward value 
involves both intellectual and emotional experiences. For Meinong, objects 
can be apprehended only by means of a subject, i.e. by means of mental 
experiences (representations, thoughts, feelings and desires). And it is by 
means of the different kinds of experiences that different classes of objects can 
be found: from intellectual experiences (representations and thoughts), 
objecta and objectives are found, and from emotional experiences (feelings and 
desires) the classes of dignitatives and desideratives are determined. Meinong 
reasserts and explains that emotions play a cognitive role and that it is by means 
of them that objects can be apprehended. He does this by introducing the 
notion of “emotional presentation” (emotionale Präsentation). 
Presentation is the act of a psychical experience that offers an object to 
thought. Traditionally – as Meinong asserts in the 1912 essay – this role was 
attributed to representations, which is partially incorrect because also 
judgments and assumptions present their peculiar objects to thought, i.e. 
objectives, and even emotions play this role. Actually, emotions are more 
imperfect than representations as cognitive experiences, but when a subject 
thinks of pleasant weather, or of a beautiful melody, then the feeling of 
pleasure that arises is not the result of thinking activity. The apprehension of 
properties like “beautiful” or “pleasant”, in fact, can be explained only by 
conferring on emotions a cognitive character. Hence, when we say that the sky 
is beautiful, we ascribe to the sky a property in the same way as when we say 
that it is blue. In any case, the experience which presents that property is not 
simply an apprehending experience, but rather an emotion. Presenting 
experiences (both intellectual and emotional) contribute to the apprehension 
of objects, as is underlined in cases where an object, though presented through 
an intellectual experience, engenders at the same time an emotional 
experience. This kind of relation can be found in the judgment “this ornament 
is beautiful”, in which there is an object (the ornament), presented by an 
intellectual experience (a representation), and another object (the beauty), 
which is instead presented by an affective experience. If the ornament is really 
beautiful, then it deserves the emotional experience which presents the 
beautiful. Beauty is thus an object of feeling (Fühlgegenstand) (Cf. Meinong, 
1912, GA III, pp. 278–279). Hence, Meinong offers the following definition 
of an object of value: 
Thus, […] an object has a value not because the interest of a subject is turned to 
it, but firstly because it deserves this interest. Or rather, put more simply: an 
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object has a value insofar as whatever has to be presented by value experiences 
actually pertains to it; and therein lies an even simpler definition: value is what 
is presented by means of value experiences. By itself, of course, an object 
presented through emotions is as little an experience as an object presented 
intellectually. Value as I understand it is thus apprehended by means of an 
experience like all that is apprehended, yet by its nature it no longer has any 
relationship to an experience: it is neither personal, nor relative; hence, it can 
be termed impersonal or even absolute (Meinong, 1912, GA III, p. 280). 
This definition – Meinong says – could apply also to Aesthetics and produce 
analogous conceptual constructions (Begriffsbildungen). Meinong was 
tempted to widen the meaning of the term “value”, but doubts about language 
made him give up (Cf. Meinong, 1912, GA III, p. 281). 
4. Aesthetic Objects: A First Acquaintance 
Meinong also treated of aesthetic objects in two earlier works. In the first, Über 
Urteilsgefühle: was sie sind und was sie nicht sind [Judgement-feelings: what 
they are and what they are not] (1905), he speaks of literature, and so he 
examines the aesthetic objects which occur in poems and novels. Against 
Theodor Lipps, who ascribes an aesthetic reality to the characters of Faust (Cf. 
Lipps, 1905, p. 489; 1906, p. 27), Meinong holds that there is only one 
reality – that of the empirical world –; notwithstanding, he admits (with Lipps) 
that as regards the characters of a novel, it is necessary to take into account 
both the real psychical experience and the unreal object (Cf. Meinong, 1905, 
GA I, p. 599–600). Even if Meinong does not manage to achieve a distinction 
between autographic and allographic works, he associates literary works with 
musical ones. With regard to the question of where these works lie and when 
they came into existence, he replies: The being of a (literary or also musical) 
work is not at all existence, but it is a being which is disconnected from space 
and time, so that in certain circumstances the work can also be lost to 
humanity, but it can never be deprived of its own being.  
Such a thesis brings forth a peculiar conception of artist’s creating activity, 
in which the artist is not so much a creator but a discoverer: 
What the artist “creates” is a more or less composite reality, which has the 
property, for those who apprehend it, to “mean” something more or less 
composite, specifically the aesthetic object, which in this way, for those who 
apprehend that reality, is picked out from among the infinite totality of the 
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objects outside of being and from whose viewpoint it can appropriately be 
designated as a predetermined object (Meinong 1905, GA I, p. 603).8 
The artist works with real material, with signs, words, propositions that express 
real experiences, which are necessarily directed toward objects, which do not 
exist but consist of a possible combination of signs, belonging to the realm of 
extra-being. From the aspect of the subject, the artist does create, while, from 
the perspective of the object, he discovers a possible combination of signs. The 
artist relates the reader to the object, and opens to the reader a world which is 
otherwise precluded – a non-existing world. Meinong strongly reaffirms that, 
leaving aside the cases of an architectural construction or a natural landscape, 
«the true object of an aesthetic attitude is not at all touched, at least 
theoretically, by the existence of reality» (Meinong, 1905, GA I, p. 605), but 
shows the peculiar immutability of the timeless object. 
Finally, regarding literature (or “‘discursive’ arts”), in Über Annahmen 
[On Assumptions] (1910) Meinong maintains that the true aesthetic objects 
are objectives and that these are apprehended by assumptions. Assumptions 
are psychical experiences, which are intermediate between representations and 
judgments (Cf. Meinong, 1902, p. 277; 1910, GA IV, p. 367 [1983, p. 
262]). They are affirmative or negative like judgments, but without claiming 
truth like representations (Cf. Meinong, 1902, p. 257; 1910, GA IV, pp. 3, 340, 
368 [1983, pp. 10, 242, 262–263]; 1921, GA VII, p. 33). Assumptions occur in 
the cases of fiction, within the realm of “as if”, and conspicuously in lies, games, 
and art (Cf. Meinong, 1902, pp. 36–37; 1910, GA IV, p. 107 [1983, p. 81]). 
Literary tales are sometimes true, but they are mostly fictions and “fiction is just 
assumption” (Meinong, 1902, p. 45; 1910, GA IV, p. 115 [1983, p. 86]). Hence 
in literature, though judgments are not excluded, we are dealing primarily with 
assumptions; and since objectives are the objects of assumptions, as of judgments, 
they are the true aesthetic objects of narrative works. Moreover, assumptions play a 
prominent role in art (Cf. Meinong, 1902, pp. 210–211; 1910, GA IV, pp. 168–
169 [1983, p. 124]), since our attitude toward aesthetic objects does not demand 
at all the conviction that these exist, and indeed the objectives that occur in art 
works are not generally believed, but assumed.9 
 
8 Cf. also (Meinong, 1910, GA IV, p. 274 [1983, p. 197]; 1915, GA VI, pp. 49 ff., esp. p. 52 fn. 1). 
9 I have discussed the theses expounded in this section more extensively in (Raspa, 2006). The 
present work may be read as a complement to that study in order to have a more complete picture of 
Meinong’s Aesthetics. 
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5. The Cognitive Functions of Emotions 
Up to this point, we have dealt with emotions and aesthetic objects, searching 
out Meinong’s position within works that treat of value theory or of topics 
other than Aesthetics. What comes out is not really a theory but a not-
structured set of thoughts. Meinong’s theses about Aesthetics are analyzed 
more in detail in Über emotionale Präsentation, where the cognitive role of 
emotional presentation (thus of emotions) is deepened, and many conceptions, 
that he developed along his career, are refined and made more precise or even 
presupposed, as the great number of cross references highlights. 
We already know that objects can be apprehended by means of 
presentation. We also know that this role is played not only by representations 
but by any kind of experience, so that if both an intellectual and an emotional 
presentation occur, then emotions take part of the cognitive process. Now we 
must turn to examine in greater depth the role played by emotions. 
In this process, representations have a ‘basic’ position. According to the 
Brentanian intentionality thesis, which Meinong endorses, any thought 
requires an object that is thought, any feeling an object that causes pleasure or 
displeasure, any desire an object toward (or against) whose being or non-being 
a subject is directed. Meinong calls this object a “presuppositional object” 
(Voraussetzungsgegenstand), which does not necessarily have to be 
apprehended by means of a representation, since – as we already know – even 
the other apprehending experiences have their own peculiar object. Anyhow, it 
must be apprehended by means of a psychical experience which – when not 
itself a representation – presupposes a representation (Cf. Meinong, 1917, 
GA III, p. 294 [1972, pp. 8–9]). Consider the case of judgment: it is a non-
independent experience, which – in order to exist – is in need of another 
experience that will function as its «psychological presupposition» (psycholo-
gische Voraussetzung) (Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 290 [1972, p. 6]). For 
Meinong, judgment always requires a representation, while the converse does 
not hold. Moreover, judgment has a double object: the one about which we 
judge (i.e. the representational object) and the one that is what is judged (i.e. 
the objective) (Cf. Meinong, 1910, GA IV, pp. 43–44 [1983, p. 38]). It is 
impossible for a judgment not to judge about something as well as not to judge 
something. This implies that judgment cannot directly apprehend its object 
and that it invokes another experience, toward which it is non-independent. 
This prerequisite experience presents the object which is judged about, so that 
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in the simplest case it is a representation, which works as a psychological 
presupposition (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 351–352 [1972, pp. 60–
61]). In this sense, any experience ‘is based’ on a representation. 
The notion of non-independence pertains both to psychical experiences 
and to objects. Meinong introduces the notion of psychological presupposition 
in 1894, but it finds a place in his subsequent production (Cf. Meinong, 1894, 
GA III, pp. 45–46; 1905, GA I, pp. 582–583), as well as the notion of 
objects’ non-independence, which is introduced in the 1899 work on higher 
order objects and later on developed and refined. For an object to be non-
independent upon another object means that the former cannot be without the 
latter, which is the peculiar condition of higher order objects and – as a 
consequence – of aesthetic objects. But we must proceed slowly here, step by 
step. 
According to Meinong, presentation can occur because any experience has 
a part (Bestandteil) or piece (Stück) – i.e. the content – which varies or remains 
constant with the object, so that it is by means of content that an object can be 
presented to thought (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 288, 339, 347 [1972, 
pp. 4, 49, 55]). If we take into account representation, it is possible to note 
that two different representations can apprehend two different objects, in 
virtue of their content. Two representational acts can differ – for example, in 
one case a subject perceives something, in the other he remembers something 
– so that in the first case the representation is perceptual, while in the second 
imaginative, but the object that is apprehended by means of these two 
representations remains unaffected by such a modification, and can be the very 
same object in both cases. But, if the object is the same, then also the content is 
the same (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 340–341 [1972, pp. 50–51]). By 
means of the analysis of content, Meinong explains how it is possible to 
acknowledge aesthetic objects. 
Meinong begins his analysis by saying that it is doubtful that emotions have 
a content in the same way as representations and judgments;10 he believes that 
emotions do have a content, but only in a peculiar way. In fact, what can be 
considered as the content of emotions or desires belongs to their psychological 
presuppositions, hence, in most cases, to representations. If someone likes a 
colour, her feeling of pleasure concerns an object (the colour) and a content, 
 
10 Meinong speaks about the content of feelings in his (1894, p. 39 passim), because at that time he 
did not yet distinguish between content and object, a distinction which was introduced in 1899 (Cf. 
Meinong, 1899, GA II, pp. 381 ss. [1978, pp. 141 ss.]). 
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which is notwithstanding an integrating part of the representation of the colour 
and not the content of a feeling. Actually, it is the content of that experience, 
which serves as a psychological presupposition of a feeling and in virtue of 
which a feeling can rise. Emotions, together with the object toward which they 
are directed, make up a complex: if someone smells a flower’s scent, then there 
is a representation, which is directed to a certain object and which serves as its 
psychological presupposition, but by means of this presupposition, the 
emotion is directed toward an object, which is hence the object of that 
emotion, and not merely the object of a representation (or of a judgment). The 
object is connected with the psychological experience toward which it is 
directed (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 314–315 [1972, pp. 26–27]). 
Perhaps however emotions may have their own content, which might not 
coincide with the content of their psychological presupposition; if this were so, 
then the cognitive role of emotional presentation and hence of emotions 
themselves, would be strengthened. 
Let us consider some examples, such as a refreshing bath, fresh air, sublime 
works of art, boring or entertaining stories: these attributes have a close 
relationship with feeling, but they are analogous to other properties which are 
usually presented by representations. If I say that the sky is blue or that it is 
beautiful, in either case a property is attributed to the sky. In the first case, the 
property is presented by a representation, in the second one, by a feeling (of 
pleasure). It can be objected that “beautiful”, “pleasant”, “sublime”, “sad”, 
“entertaining” express feelings but that they cannot be ascribed to objects 
(things or events). Meinong replies to this objection that, by analogy, when we 
say that the sky is blue, we do not intend to ascribe a representation as a 
property to the sky. Here he states the same thesis as in 1912, but while it is 
patent that experiences are not properties ascribable to objects, it is harder to 
say that the sadness of a melody is not a feeling but a higher order object that 
can be apprehended by means of an emotional presentation. 
There is another objection, Meinong wants to overcome: feelings are more 
subjective than representations, so that it is hard to look at feelings as capable 
of characterizing objects with regard to their objective properties. Consider 
again the example about the sky. When someone says that the sky is blue, what 
she really wants to say is that she is having a sensation of blue caused by the sky. 
Anyhow, the judgment is not about the sensation perceived by the judging 
person, but about the sky and its property of being blue. The same analysis can 
then be applied to the judgment “the sky is beautiful”, so that between the 
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feeling of liking and the sky there is the same relation as holds between the sky 
and the representation of blue. Feelings thus, under favourable circumstances, 
can present a content. Moreover, Meinong elicits the analogy between feelings 
and representations by asserting that the character of subjectivity proper to 
feelings does not preclude them from presenting an object to thought, because 
it is also shared by representations. Subjectivity is hence an obstacle to 
apprehension, but it does not preclude it and this implies that even feelings – 
which are more subjective than representations – allow for some sort of 
knowledge. Presentation must be admitted also for feelings, otherwise many 
objects would remain inaccessible to apprehension, because feelings allow for 
the apprehension of peculiar features of reality. Hence, despite all their 
peculiarities, feelings have an affinity with intellectual experiences, or as 
Meinong puts it, «a quasi-intellectual functioning» (Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 
320 [1972, p. 31]). 
Looking again at attributes like beautiful or pleasant, we can inquire after 
what kind of properties they are. Meinong maintains that something can be 
called beautiful or pleasant if it gives rise to a feeling of pleasure. Anyhow, he 
also stresses the fact that when someone attributes the property of being 
beautiful or of being ugly to something, she is referring to the object’s 
properties, not to her own feelings. Here, Meinong asserts – in a way that 
seems patently in contrast with the preceding – that an aesthetic property like 
beauty is not constituted by its relation to an experience but is an object in 
itself, a higher order object like the sadness of a melody, which is presented by 
means of a feeling (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 324, 365–366 [1972, pp. 
35, 72]).11 I will attempt to analyse this point more closely at the end of the 
present paper, but for the moment it is worth looking at the second kind of 
non-independence, the one pertaining to objects. 
This non-independence assumes different forms, according to the kind of 
being that it helps to constitute. There is (a) a non-independence of existence, 
if an object cannot exist unless another object exists; (b) a non-independence 
of subsistence, as the one exemplified by the equiangularity of a triangle on its 
equilaterality; (c) a non-independence that has nothing to do with existence or 
subsistence (i.e. being), but concerns so-being. Any object of higher order can 
be taken as an example of (c): difference is non-independent, since there can 
 
11 For a critical analysis of this point, which involves feeling-expressivism and realism, see (Langlet, 
2010). 
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be no difference without something that is different (which must be already a 
plurality). Moreover, this something does not necessarily have to exist and even 
less to subsist (the round square is different from the oval triangle). Hence, «if 
there is to be any meaningful talk about difference at all, we must presuppose 
so-beings with a ‘so’ such that ‘difference’ can be applied to them» (Meinong, 
1917, GA III, p. 353 [1972, p. 61]; translation slightly modified). Actually, 
without a plurality there would be no difference, not even in the sense of extra-
being, while if there is a plurality in the sense of extra-being, the difference 
between them would have not merely extra-being but subsistence. In cases of 
this sort, higher order objects show (d) a peculiar non-independence of extra-
being. The relation between inferiora and their superius is not convertible; this 
assertion must not be interpreted psychologically – as meaning that difference 
cannot be thought of without what is different – rather, simply as a necessary 
fact occurring to what is different, which does not involve any thought of the 
difference. What is different is «logically prior» (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, 
pp. 353–354 [1972, p. 62]). 
The main kind of higher order objects is formed by founded objects 
(fundierte Gegenstände) and necessity is essential for them. A logical prius 
comes along, whenever a posterius is in need of it, whereas the prius has no 
kind of dependence on the posterius. In cases of this kind, one may speak of a 
foundation (Fundierung), which, as is true of psychological presupposition, is 
similar to what obtains between judgments and representations: «Judgments 
cannot exist without underlying ideas, whereas there is no objection in 
principle to ideas being given without judgments» (Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 
356 [1972, p. 64]). This relation of dependence is equivalent – ontologically 
– to the one subsisting between objectives and objecta and it plays a 
fundamental role, as we will see, for the acknowledgment of a peculiar kind of 
higher order object, like absolute beauty. 
This new framework allows us to better understand the thesis that Meinong 
already presented in 1894: aesthetic feelings are feelings of so-being, in 
contrast with value-feelings which are feelings of being (Cf. Meinong, 1917, 
GA III, pp. 373, 375–376 [1972, pp. 80, 81–82]).12 
We have seen that aesthetic feelings can have not only representations but 
also judgments and assumptions as their psychological presupposition. Now, 
 
12 Here Meinong modifies his previous conception, according to which value feelings are feelings of 
existence (see § 2). 
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judgments and assumptions have objectives as their presuppositional object 
and this means that our aesthetic attitude is directed also toward objectives. As 
we have stated earlier, aesthetic feelings are not directed toward being but only 
toward so-being. But does this mean that they are never directed toward 
existence? Taking literature as an example, Meinong easily shows that 
aesthetic feelings disregard the actual being of their objects. In dramas, it often 
happens that assumptions pass over into judgments, so that an «astonishing 
sovereignty of poetic or, more generally, artistic imagination» emerges: 
So, for example, in modern drama, exact information is frequently given as to 
the age or other properties of the characters in the play. At first this 
information can only be of the order of assumptions. But once such 
assumptions are made, the characters in question are indeed of the indicated 
age, as if the playwright were free to do with them as he wished (Meinong, 
1917, GA III, p. 374 [1972, p. 80]; translation slightly modified). 
According to this thesis, so-being plays a constitutive role for aesthetic objects 
and feelings; but it seems opposed to everything that compels us to attribute 
aesthetic dignity to objects of sensation or to higher order creations founded 
on those objects. We can look at music, but especially to sculpture and 
painting. According to Meinong, a colour, shape or sound even if they are not a 
so-being, they are a so (ein So), and a so is always present in any case of so-
being. This answer can be seen as unsatisfactory but the point at issue is this: if 
it is true that the mere so-being even of non-existent objects can be the 
presuppositional object of an aesthetic feeling, then this is enough for 
Meinong to say that aesthetic feelings are not – in their proper essence – 
feelings of being. Thus, aesthetic feelings are «really indifferent whether their 
object-presuppositions are serious or imaginative» (Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 
375 [1972: 81]): as drama shows, aesthetic feelings can be determined even 
when their presuppositions consists of assumptions about untrue happenings. 
In such a case, aesthetic feelings are true feelings, and this hold also when the 
ones caused by the drama are imaginative.13 
6. Aesthetic Objects as Higher Order Objects 
We come now more specifically to the objects of aesthetic feelings. If it is true 
 
13 I have dealt with the dichotomy serious/imaginative as well with the difference between real feelings 
and phantasy-feelings in (Raspa, 2006 and 2010). 
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that an aesthetic object is one possessing aesthetic properties, it is also true 
that such are those properties which are capable of arousing aesthetic feelings. 
Stephan Witasek developed an aesthetic theory deeply rooted in Meinong’s 
philosophy.14 In the Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik, he maintained that 
«an object becomes an aesthetic object, if it is bearer of aesthetic properties» 
(Witasek, 1904, p. 27). But what kind of properties are the aesthetic ones? On 
the basis of Meinong’s dichotomy of real/ideal, Witasek explains that aesthetic 
properties, the most characteristic of which is beauty, are not real, i.e. 
perceptible, but ideal non-perceptible properties (Cf. Witasek, 1904, p. 14). 
If I look at a painting, I perceive masses of colour, not the beauty of the 
painting; if I listen to a melody, I hear sounds, but the beauty is not something 
existing alongside them. Moreover, an aesthetic property like beauty is not an 
objectual (gegenständliche) property, that is, a property which is represented 
together (mitvorgestellt, mitgedacht) with the representation of the object and 
can then describe it. For example, colour is an objectual property of a painting, 
but the similarity of this to a copy is not. The same holds for beauty, which is «an 
extra-objectual (außergegenständliche) determination of its bearer» (Witasek, 
1904, p. 15). 
Still in the Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik, Witasek says that an object is 
aesthetic when it is the object to which our feeling of pleasure and displeasure is 
directed. This means that aesthetic properties are relational, because they connect 
the aesthetic object to the mental attitude of a human subject. The relation is, on 
one hand, a causal one, whereby an aesthetic object (a painting, statue, or melody) 
induces an aesthetic attitude in the subject, and, on the other hand, a final relation, 
for the aesthetic feeling is in turn addressed to the aesthetic object. 
An aesthetic property of an object is the fact that it may stand in a causal or final 
relation with a subject’s aesthetic attitude (Witasek, 1904, p. 22). 
Therefore, an object becomes an aesthetic object, insofar as it stands, or can stand, 
in a given relation with a subject. This does not entail that objectual 
determinations, real or ideal, are indifferent in order for an object – for example – 
to be beautiful: «being beautiful means standing in a certain relation to a subject,» 
(Witasek, 1904, p. 28) and such a relation depends on the properties of the 
object. 
 
14 I deal very shortly with Witasek and only in relation to Meinong’s point of view; for more details on 
Witasek’s Aesthetics see (Smith, 1996), (Schuhmann, 2001), (Reicher, 2006, pp. 313–319), 
(Allesch 1987, pp. 357 ss. and 2010), (Raspa, 2006, pp. 65 ss., and 2010, pp. 21–38). 
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In Über ästhetische Objektivität [On aesthetic Objectivity] (1915), 
Witasek states more precisely the essential characteristics of aesthetic objects: 
these are the non-independence (Unselbständigkeit) from the substratum, 
which means that the being of an aesthetic object is founded on the being of 
another or other objects, and the dependence (Abhängigkeit) on variations of 
the substratum (Cf. Witasek, 1915, pp. 105, 108, 110–112). Meinong 
shares this thesis, but that does not mean that he agrees completely with his 
pupil. The points of disagreement between the two are relevant and relate to 
the role of objectives in Aesthetics, to different conception of phantasy-feeling, 
and – what for us is more important in this context – to the notion of aesthetic 
object, namely whether this is or is not an object of higher order. However, 
Meinong discusses in details Witasek’s point of view, which he examines 
closely with the intention of developing it further (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, 
pp. 387 ff. [1972, pp. 92 ff.]; Witasek, 1915, 112 ff., 180 ff.). 
We have seen (§ 5) that an intrinsic non-independence applies not only to 
psychical experiences, but also to objects. That is why Meinong can speak 
about a parallelism between objects and the experiences which apprehend 
them. We know that the presenting experiences have as psychological 
presuppositions other experiences, which are above all intellectual 
experiences; in the same way, aesthetic objects are non-independent of being 
and dependent on so-being upon what is apprehended by the presuppositional 
experiences. This is the translation in Meinong’s language of Witasek’s thesis. 
Like the property “red”, the property “beautiful” requires a substratum, 
something of which it is a property; but it requires in addition another property 
or set of properties as its basis. The property beautiful is then non-
independent from its basis and dependent upon the characteristics of such a 
basis. This makes it possible that a thing is more beautiful or uglier than 
another. There are evident analogies between aesthetic properties and objects 
of higher order. For example, similarity does not occur without similar objects; 
moreover, whether, and to what extent, two objects are similar, depends on the 
characteristics of the objects. Therefore, aesthetic properties seem to be ideal 
objects of higher order. But according to Witasek there are four reasons that 
exclude such a possibility. In what follows I will deal only with the two of them, 
which are discussed by Meinong.15 I will restrict my remarks to beauty, but the 
discourse may also be extended to other aesthetic properties. 
 
15 For more details see (Raspa, 2006, pp. 73–77). 
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Witasek observes that an object of higher order, like similarity, is between 
the two members, connects them and builds with them a complex; beauty does 
instead not connect, for example, the tones of a melody, but has the whole 
melody as its basis. As a consequence, one can see that beauty does not need a 
plurality of inferiora as its basis, as objects of higher order do, but rather a 
unity; for objects of higher order, on the contrary, being based on a unity is a 
limiting case (namely that of identity) (Cf. Meinong, 1899, GA II, 394 [1978: 
149]). If Witasek is right, much of Meinong’s theory concerning aesthetic 
objects falls apart. 
Meinong sees the major difficulties by accepting that aesthetic objects are 
objects of higher order in the oneness (Einsheit) of the substratum and 
identifies Witasek’s error in his having considered objects of higher order only 
from the point of view of objecta, and not also from that of objectives. This is 
Meinong’s argument: if objectives are also objects of higher order; and there 
are objectives that are not based on a plurality of inferiora – like objectives of 
being (“A is”) or of existence (“A exists”), which are monadic by nature –; then 
not all objects of higher order need a plurality of inferiora, and if this is so, the 
main obstacle in considering aesthetic objects as objects of higher order, that is 
the oneness of substratum, no longer subsists. Their dependence on the 
substrata presented by the psychological object-presuppositions of aesthetic-
feelings is a sign – just as Witasek recognized – of the superius character of 
aesthetic objects, which can be subsumed under the concept of higher order 
objects. 
7. Absolute Beauty 
The last question that is still open concerns objective beauty. We have seen 
that emotional experiences are means of knowing objects. But knowing – 
Meinong says – is always an intellectual operation; an emotional experience 
cannot alone apprehend an object, but only if it is connected with an 
intellectual experience as its psychological presupposition (Cf. Meinong, 
1917, GA III, p. 403 [1972, p. 106]). 
If knowledge is justified judgment, and if – although under certain 
conditions – emotions are means of knowledge, one wonders if they too 
possess the moment of justification (Berechtigungsmoment). But if emotions 
are not sufficient for knowledge, then a part of their justification should be 
searched in non-emotional experiences. 
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To address the issues, Meinong considers the analogy of ideas. 
Traditionally, it has been denied that ideas can be true or false; nonetheless, 
one says that someone has a right or a false idea, if by means of it one may make 
a true or a false judgment. If we substitute the idea as means of presentation 
with an emotion, then the reason that the corresponding judgment is justified 
or not can be attributed to the emotion. An emotion is then never justified per 
se, but in relation to an object toward which it is directed. Nobody would say 
that a feeling of pleasure is justified or not justified, but one may be justified or 
unjustified in being pleased with something or with a certain fact – one is 
unjustified in taking pleasure from the pain of raped children. Meinong 
synthesizes this idea in this way: 
If P is an object presented by an emotion p, then it is justifiable to attach the 
emotion p to an object A if P in fact applies to A (dem A zukommt), and the 
judgment “A is P” is therefore correct (Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 414–415 
[1972, p. 115]). 
In other words, an emotion is justified if the judgment which attributes the 
proper object of the emotion (a predicate like the beauty) to its 
presuppositional objects (for example, a subject like a melody) is justified. So 
the way to an objective beauty is open (as it was hypothesized at the end of § 2). 
Let us come back to the analogy with values. Meinong defines value as «the 
capacity of an object to attract interest upon itself as a value-objectum» 
(Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 426 [1972, p. 125]). It is obvious to speak of a 
relativity of all values, since the value of a thing often depends on the value of 
another thing, on the stock of material goods (according to the law of marginal 
utility), on the nature or on the interest of the subject. On the other hand, there 
are also good reasons for speaking against such a relativism. First of all – 
Meinong observes – if an object loses value as soon as the subject feel no more 
interest in it, reading and writing should not have any value for the majority of 
children, nor food, clothes and house for those who were in a state of mental 
confusion. On the contrary, we all recognize the value of those activities and 
things; therefore, the value may not coincide with the mere interest of the 
subject. Secondly, there should be no errors even with respect to the value 
(Wertirrtümer), which derive instead from the lack of attention to that “should 
reasonably have” (see § 3). Referring to the case of superstition already 
discussed in 1894, Meinong points out that, if the value depends on the mere 
interest of the subject, then one might attribute to a putative divining rod as 
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much value as to a medicinal plant. On that occasion, he had spoken in the first 
case of “subjective value”, in the second of “objective value”, and he 
recognized axiological dignity also to the subjective value; now, instead, he 
assumes that whoever judges correctly denies a value to a divining rod. 
Moreover, if the existence of the subject is the ultimate foundation of all values, 
it would be superior to any value and life would be the highest good. Finally, it 
would even be possible for some people to turn good into bad, right into wrong 
(Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 427–430 [1972, pp. 125–127]). 
Now, even though the predicate “valuable” does not differ characteristically 
from the predicate “beautiful” – so that the former means the capacity of an 
object to attract a value feeling, the latter the capacity of an object to attract an 
aesthetic feeling –, this does not however imply that the relation to the subject 
enters into the definition of both predicates. The relation to the subject is 
constitutive neither of the value nor of the beauty. If we paraphrase what 
Meinong writes on value, then we can say that ‘beauty (or another aesthetic 
object) does not primarily consist in the capacity to attract aesthetic 
experiences to itself but simply consists in what is presented by aesthetic 
experiences’ (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 432–433 [1972, p. 130]). 
In stating this, Meinong does not replace the concept of relative value with 
that of relation-free value, but simply affirms that there are two notions of 
value. He synthesizes this with reference to value experiences as means of 
knowledge: 
Value-experiences can, in particular, be utilized as the means of knowing the 
objects to which they attach. They are a means of knowing (Erkenntismittel) in 
a double sense. First, in the sense that what is presented by the value-
experience is to be attributed to the objects as their property, and secondly in 
the sense that the objects have the property of provoking the experience which 
corresponds to the object of presentation (e.g., value). It is clear that the 
second interpretation remains valid even when the first does not, and even 
when the first cannot with right be attempted at all (Meinong, 1917, GA III, 
pp. 427–435 [1972, p. 132]). 
To sum up, Meinong endorses two notions of value, a value relative to a 
subject and a relation-free value. Both are of great importance in value theory 
and in life. With the help of the concept of justification, one can say that there 
is a relative value wherever there is a value-experience regardless of its 
justification, while a relation-free value is always connected with a justification. 
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One could call the first kind of value ‘objective’ and the second kind 
‘subjective’, but since Meinong used these terms as applying to relative values 
(see § 2), then he proposes the terms ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’. 
Meinong repeatedly reaffirms that what is true for the domain of value also 
applies per analogiam to the aesthetic domain (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 
452, 455, 458 [1972, pp. 147, 149, 151]), and therefore it is legitimate to 
ask whether there is beside a personal (relative) beauty also an impersonal 
(relation-free) beauty. 
The question has received a negative answer by those who, like Witasek 
(Cf. Witasek, 1915, 198 f.), argue that neither the existence of objects of 
perception nor the existence of ideal objects of higher order can belong to 
aesthetic objects, that these are to be taken into consideration only as objects 
of apprehension, that is, in relation to a subject, and that aesthetic norms are 
laws of psychical attitude. Meinong has instead shown that aesthetic objects are 
ideal objects of higher order; for these the a priori knowledge is appropriate, 
but is it really possible to know aesthetic objects a priori? The aesthetic 
character of an object cannot be verified empirically, since a property like 
beauty can adhere to the existent (i.e., to nature) as well as to the non-existent, 
as is proven by arts. On the other hand, if the same melody can be considered 
good, bad or indifferent, then it would seem that there is no a priori, and hence 
necessary connection between the melody and its corresponding aesthetic 
property, but anything which is known a priori is necessary. Therefore, if 
aesthetic objects are accessible neither to empirical nor to a priori knowledge, 
they belong to the domain of the Erleben and the relativistic point of view is 
justified (Cf. Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 453–454 [1972, pp. 148–149]). 
However, if one considers Greek sculpture and German poetry or music, it is 
difficult to maintain an “absolute relativity”. 
Given this situation, it seems that, as in the case of values, there is a 
personal (relative) beauty and an impersonal (relation-free) beauty. But how 
can the latter be demonstrated? According to Meinong, the ideality of an object 
is accessible to empirical knowledge. It is indeed possible to apply induction to 
not existent but subsistent instances, and hence 
it can happen that a state of affairs knowable a priori, that is, a necessary state of 
affairs (Sachverhalt), is connected with real (reale) concomitant state of affairs, 
in which latter natural lawfulness may make its appearance, that can be 
established empirically, or rather, inductively (Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 456 
[1972, p. 150]). 
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For example, the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle may 
be proved a priori, but it may also be established by measuring of a number of 
triangles. 
Meinong’s aim is not to say that inductive knowledge attains the same 
necessity of a priori knowledge, but to show, rather, that by induction one can 
reach relation-free results. 
On the basis of a fundamental analogy between the beauty and value, and 
starting from the analysis of the latter, Meinong intends to argue that there is 
also an impersonal beauty, as well as an impersonal value. Since the empirical 
data available to us are personal values, it is only by way of these, by induction, 
that one can reach impersonal values. 
That an objectum A has the impersonal value N can be concluded under favorable 
circumstances from the fact that in A the personal value N occurs, i.e., that the idea 
of A under favorable circumstances arouses an emotion, or at first a feeling, which 
presents the object N. By reason of this presentation, it is presumed that the object 
A serves as foundation for the object N. The presentation here is the concomitant 
fact through which the induction gets hold of the a priori fact of the foundation [of 
the value in the object] (Meinong, 1917, GA III, pp. 456–457 [1972, p. 150]). 
The object N is an object of higher order, and if it is founded on the object A, 
this implies that there is a relation of necessity between the inferius A and the 
superius N. Is this the same necessity which holds in the domain of the a priori? 
We can only presume (vermuten) it, since the process we adopted was 
induction, but our surmise is justified (in the sense we have seen above). 
We can now develop Meinong’s argument per analogiam. If N means 
‘beautiful’ and it is founded on A, then A is beautiful, and if A serves as 
foundation for N, relation-free beauty pertains to it simply by virtue of the 
foundation. All this does not hold as a proof that there is a relation-free 
absolute beauty, since in connection with emotional presentation the 
impersonal beauty is accessible to us only through a detour by way of 
experience, that is, by way of the personal beauty, but– to adopt Meinong’s 
words – «the way has been cleared to give reasons for such» (e.g., impersonal 
beauty) (Meinong, 1917, GA III, p. 460 [1972, p. 153]). 
Do we find this disappointing? Whatever the case, the same Meinong will 
interpret – at the end of his life – by an analogy with Fechner’s concept of a 
“bottom-up Aesthetics” – his own whole work as a “bottom-up philosophy” 
(Philosophie von unten);  
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and such a philosophy encompasses within it also the theory of objects 
unreservedly, in so far as it may start from the given subsistent or even outside 
of-being [ausserseiend] as an empirical science can start from what is given in 
experience (Meinong, 1921, GA VII, pp. 42–43).16 
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